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AJ: In reference to your work in 
feminist philosophy of religion, Tina 
Beattie implied that you were per-
haps less willing to explain the “par-
ticularity” of your “own religious 
positioning” (Beattie, New Catholic 
Feminism
feminist genealogy than your cri-
tique of “male-neutral” would seem 
to require (cf. Anderson, A Feminist 
Philosophy
be prepared to say something about 
your own background and the re-
lationship of what you see as your 
-
PSA: -
terview I will position myself in 
relation to my own religious back-
ground, or if you like, my “feminist 
it is important to admit that over 
the years I have found theologians 
-
plicit religious positioning given to 
my own yearning, very frustrating! 
to either misunderstand or dismiss 
the nature of my feminist struggle. 
In particular, this has obscured my 
struggle against an intransigent epis-
temological obstacle which blocked 
own in philosophy.
For example, Beattie recognizes 
that the heart of my feminism is 
-
lenges my philosophical method for 
being blind to my own religious po-
male philosophers of doing when 
if these methods are neutral of my 
own presuppositions and, in partic-
ular, my religious positioning. Beat-
tie also recognizes my determina-
tion to uncover and to struggle with 
the myths of gender identity em-
bedded in the texts of philosophy of 
my own religious desire, in order to 
explore the resistance to gender-op-
pression within other religious tra-
ditions, notably in Hindu practices 
of Up-
).
After having been trained to 
with the hermeneutic insight of Paul 
Ricoeur, I began to see the vital need 
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Ricoeurian hermeneutics. The need 
feminists to learn from the gender 
practices of other cultures, especial-
ly through the religious matters of 
-
sitive to damaging presuppositions, 
explicitly aware of the serious and 
generally hidden obstacle to recog-
nizing oppressive gender-bias not 
Feminist Standpoint,” but in both 
reading and discussing Sandra Hard-
-
mology” (Harding, ). 
epistemological method, employing 
-
inist philosophy of religion (Ander-
son,
in epistemology remains “weak” as 
long as we are unaware of our own 
privileged positions in making claims 
to knowledge but, equally, of our 
reasons for action and religious prac-
tices. We can only acquire more ob-
the lives of others” who occupy po-
sitions on the margins of the domi-
nant epistemology (Harding, 
Science? and “Rethinking Stand-
A Feminist Philosophy
feminist task is not thinking that we 
have neutrality, but instead is strug-
-
native account of oneself as another. 
We gain less partial knowledge both 
of ourselves and of others not by 
working towards the engaged vision 
Hartsock and Harding were articu-
lating the standpoint of women in 
philosophy. But to uncover gen-
der oppression in the social and 
epistemic relations of philosophy, 
each of these feminist philosophers 
sought “a feminist standpoint” 
which was not simply that of being 
-
-
ally raised by the feminist stand-
point epistemologists. Instead such 
questions were often left to fem-
inist psycholinguists (like, for ex-
ample, Luce Irigaray who was read 
by Beattie) and to queer theorists. 
-
gion, I gained much from consider-
ing these different sorts of feminist 
questions, while working to avoid 
contradictions. However, my read-
ers did not always agree with, or 
follow, this ambition.
AJ: Perhaps, nevertheless, readers 
might be as interested in the con-
text within which you have come to 
this philosophical position as in its 
nuances.
PSA: I grew up in the Lutheran 
“mid-west” of the United States, 
314
Pamela Sue Anderson Talks to Alison Jasper
-
-
rived at St Olaf, my real passion 
was French language and literature, 
but I was told that I needed more 
than “French.” When I arrived in 
Oxford, having spent some time in 
France, my plan was to combine my 
interests in French with Philosophy 
by working on the French philoso-
pher, Ricoeur, whose hermeneutic 
little read by Oxford philosophers, 
my tutors in Philosophy to take 
my interest in his writings seri-
ously (while today international 
-
ish). On the one hand, Oxford ana-
lytic philosophers were suspicious 
other hand, Christian philosophers 
philosophy meeting the rigorous 
standards of philosophical argu-
mentation for Christian theism.
To make matters worse for my 
dual interests in French and in Phi-
losophy, many of those people close 
to me within the Lutheran tradition 
which linked St Olaf College (as 
College (as the only Oxford col-
Lutheran Theology) would never 
recognize my intellectual passions 
as suitable for “a girl” from Min-
nesota, suitable for the heartland of 
Lutheran Protestantism! Looking 
-
ment of unsuitability clear to me 
were dismissive comments about 
my enigmatic behaviour, puzzled 
expressions, teasing, general lack of 
understanding of, or conversations 
about, my goals. I became used to 
expecting disapproval and accepted 
the lack of support I found from 
the religious authorities in the col-
leges which, in turn, obscured other 
personal and intellectual support.
In the light of this religious back-
ground, you could say that I came, 
eventually, to feminist philosophy 
of religion via my consistent experi-
ences of resistance to having “ideas 
to think philosophically rather than 
conform to the mid-western Lu-
theran image of theology and of 
example, being “a good girl” as both 
gender ideal. Even if this ideal could 
-
traction of French language, culture 
and literature provided me with the 
freedom to question my upbring-
ing (perhaps, another language or 
purpose). Confronting cultural dif-
ferences provided an opportunity to 
think beyond the perspectives which 
had been imposed in being brought 
up Lutheran in Minnesota. It could 
not be true that the best life was to 
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be Lutheran and to “settle down” in 
the Twin Cities (i.e., Minneapolis-
The attraction of philosophy lay in 
the possibility of thinking for my-
-
gether with other people.
So, in reply to your question 
-
est about my religious positioning, 
I admit that this background has 
Philosophy and European culture 
-
and my personal thinking. Femi-
nism added to the intellectual task 
possibility of empowering women 
(including myself) to not accept 
of gender, sexual orientation, race, 
ethnicity or religion. Feminist phi-
losophy continues to offer an anti-
dote to certain kinds of dishonesty 
and self-deception, especially to ex-
cessive piety.
AJ:
woman philosopher in those stu-
PSA: I would say, in the philosophi-
cal terms of Michèle Le Doeuff, 
“the primal scene”  of my education 
For my more detailed discussion of “the 
primal scene” in Le Doeuff, see Anderson, 
-
resisting the Lutheran norms of 
piety which I found burdensome 
inside my head paralyzed my well-
-
own, they are respectful of (male) 
authority!” To silence this inner 
-
-
tional voice in my own head would 
-
-
pean cities, foreign institutions and 
other cultures, searching in libraries 
and hiding away in impenetrable 
books.”
Nevertheless, some sense of be-
lief that I could think for myself and 
to women and men in philosophy 
(of religion) remained. My desire 
gradually stronger. But I have never 
had an easy relation to the branch 
of philosophy to which I am most 
often associated: that is, to the phi-
losophy of religion. I am constantly 
uncovering problematic norms such 
as the omni-attributes of the tradi-
tional theistic God which still dom-
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philosophy had prepared me for the 
resistance I would continue to expe-
-
I gave tutorials in modern philoso-
the American Philosophical Asso-
ciation, Eastern Division meetings 
predictable that I would have been 
competing with other philosophers 
of religion and especially, in the 
USA, from Notre Dame Univer-
sity where philosophers are trained 
in the Anglo-American tradition 
in the Christian philosophy of re-
ligion which remains the privileged 
tradition in Oxford.
An ongoing failure to be recog-
and not merely as someone from St 
Olaf College doing Christian phi-
and predictable. In any event, it was, 
of my career that I defend myself 
and succeed from the beginning in 
this world which remains not only 
highly competitive (and elitist), but 
often very hostile to women. There 
-
an I could be “up there” with the 
very best of philosophers, but that 
my choice of Ricoeur, with his, 
to some, unconventional literary, 
theological and scriptural interests, 
was fully worthy of the philosophi-
cal attention men were lovingly de-
-
losophers who, in comparison with 
-
far less to say to me at that point.
Already during those early years 
in Oxford, I learned to compromize 
my passions in order to achieve my 
philosopher. For instance, Ricoeur 
not be studied on his own, but only 
with the legitimation of the canon-
-
-
disdain of all postmodern theorists, 
as well as that of the radically or-
thodox, the conservative and the 
neo-Barthian theologians. How-
-
curb my ambition or demonstrate 
-
losophy, his aim failed: and I took 
philosophical doubters wrong!
It was this sort of academic cli-
mate that did eventually facilitate 
through Harding during the short 
period of time I spent teaching at 
Delaware and second, through Le 
Doeuff for years right up to the pre-
-
phy, engaging the “forbidden texts” 
of the male philosophers, but also 
going beyond this to read and un-
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derstand the critical work of women 
like Harding herself who introduced 
me to the writings of Alison Jaggar, 
Seyla Benhabib and the early work 
of Judith Butler on issues of the 
self. The latter two feminists, along 
of the debates over the postmodern 
“death” of the self, of metaphysics 
and of history. The timely question 
was: can feminism be compatible 
Le Doeuff would become more 
and be shaped by the subtle and 
witty insight found in her Philo-
sophical Imaginary and Hipparchia’s
Choice
readings of the history of philoso-
and have ideas. Her third book, The
Sex of Knowing, offers additional 
ground to discover those women 
whose ideas have been “disinher-
ited” by the tradition of philosophy 
excluding women. The image of the 
female Alexandrian philosopher 
and astronomer, Hypatia, who fell 
mob for celebrating her knowledge 
-
Doeuff (The Sex of Knowing
-
inheritance in philosophy appeared 
well before Agora
and martyr Hypatia in the cinema 
of Europe and the USA. In spite of 
many similar cautionary tales, none 
of the inspiring women uncovered 
by Le Doeuff in the history of phi-
losophy are daunted by the task of 
challenging men on their own intel-
lectual turf.
AJ:
Sunderland University. How did 
-
PSA: My particular approach to 
-
I went to Sunderland. My goal in 
working in the NE of England was 
to gain the freedom to write, teach 
and publish in feminist philosophy. 
It was also to work on that personal 
positioning and feminist philo-
sophical consciousness that your 
criticisms of “my [non-neutral] 
to Sunderland for that freedom and 
by conservative traditions in phi-
for feminist scholars generally and 
philosophy. So, for my scholarship, 
this period was liberating and pro-
ductive, giving me the opportunity 
-
nist critique of the philosophy of 
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monograph, A Feminist Philosophy 
of Religion
invite Michèle Le Doeuff to speak 
to my colleagues and students. And 
carried on in Oxford, inviting Le 
Doeuff regularly to inspire femi-
nist and non-feminist philosophers 
alike with her political wit and phil-
osophical scholarship.
AJ: A Feminist Philosophy of Re-
ligion
-
tique of and challenge to Christian 
male epistemic privilege.
PSA: A Feminist Philosophy of 
Religion aimed to expose the weak-
nesses of building male knowledge 
on the self-aggrandizement of the 
male philosopher who is propped 
up by the blind infatuation of the 
critique of the Héloïse complex
helped me to expose the weakness 
of both the (female/male) lover and 
the (male) beloved: the one lover 
“Héloïse complex” is diagnosed by 
Michèle Le Doeuff (Hipparchia’s Choice,
women in philosophy to idolize either 
and Beauvoir). This idolization could be 
who is named and destroys the woman by 
removing her intellectual independence and 
ability to create philosophy herself.
view that knowledge as “male” could 
never be anything but “weak” as 
Moreover, the false consciousness of 
both the lover and the beloved not 
only applied to the pattern of disci-
ple and master, female and male, but 
to human and divine. This implicit 
-
became even more central to Le 
The Sex of Knowing and in her Wei-
AJ: A Feminist Philosophy of Re-
ligion also brought you into rela-
tionship and often contention with 
-
gians and philosophers of religion, 
including Grace Jantzen, Tina Be-
attie, Luce Irigaray, Sarah Coakley. 
Some of these relationships seem 
-
acter. Would you agree and how 
PSA:
Immediately, after its publication 
I did not understand terribly well 
why these feminist theologians 
and feminist philosophers of reli-
gion seemed to misunderstand the 
arguments in A Feminist Philoso-
phy of Religion. I have been frus-
trated by their failure as feminists 
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to understand my text. Perhaps this 
should have been expected because 
-
losopher had not been with other 
women (neither with female theo-
logians nor female philosophers of 
religion). This formation had not 
been typical in terms of either my 
greatest perplexity was with other 
feminist philosophers of religion 
not following my lead to Harding 
and to Le Doeuff.
In addition to feminist theolo-
in their impatience with my text is 
an assumption, roughly, due to Iri-
garay and other psycholinguists that 
“feminist” thinking equals express-
thought to be possible in becom-
never been my vision for feminist 
philosophers or for women general-
ly, especially insofar as suiting patri-
archal idolizations of femininity. In-
stead I hold an Enlightenment view 
of philosophical thinking as rational 
-
ical or theological view of women as 
generically different from men.
A Feminist Philosophy of Reli-
gion -
tious text on two counts for those 
feminist theologians and psycho-
linguists who were advocating 
the latter is unlike either the Marx-
ist or the liberal feminists who had 
-
gle to transform philosophy in or-
der to include women as equals. 
First, the text does not equate 
feminist with being or becoming 
self-expression in feminine lan-
guage. Second, the text does not 
advocate any particular conception 
I left explicitly to theologians. Per-
haps, though, A Feminist Philoso-
phy of Religion reads (to some) as 
if I am ambivalent about psychoa-
nalysis and theology, generally. 
Ironically, I am more ambivalent 
about the Lacanian preoccupations 
of many contemporary, sexual-dif-
ference feminist theologians than 
Freud or Lacan themselves. I tried 
of doubt when it came to their the-
ology. But I was not and can never 
be in agreement with feminine psy-
cholinguistics enabling Christian 
women to become divine. I remain 
-
er than sexual-difference) feminist, 
sexual difference, or sexually dif-
ferent desires as the way to (knowl-
edge of, or intimacy with) God.
A Feminist Philosophy of Religion 
treats religion as both an academic 
reality. I never equate religion with 
desire for or knowledge of God. 
Nor do I equate feminist philoso-
phy of religion with feminist theol-
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ogy or feminist spirituality.
think that for the sake of women 
themselves feminists can allow “re-
-
-
Reassuring women of their own 
separate sphere of spirituality as, for 
God (Coakley, “Feminism and Ana-
-
danger of this different sphere for 
-
triarchal forms of sexist oppression. 
intellect address this critical danger.
AJ: A Feminist Philosophy of Reli-
gion
mythic inheritance in the west as 
This imaginative form of mime-
sis, or “philosophical imaginary,” 
aims to be compatible with think-
-
To qualify this claim, I must agree with 
-
aims to locate and reclaim the autonomous 
female self in her own political and religious 
PSA:
clear. After discussing Le Doeuff 
and Harding, A Feminist Philosophy 
of Religion brings in Irigaray and Ju-
-
mension of that which has been ex-
cluded by male social, material and 
epistemic privileges in philosophy 
-
metic strategy has to be disruptive 
form of mimesis for not being dis-
ruptive of patriarchal myths. How-
ever, I never give up my alliance 
the philosophical imaginary, of rea-
who “allows no one to think in her 
place.”
AJ: In an extended review of -
nist Philosophy of Religion, Sarah 
-
count of reality you tried to align 
with forms of feminist standpoint 
epistemology as drawn from Harding 
(Coakley, “Feminism and Analytic 
Philosophy”). Her critique, interest-
ing though it was in some ways, was 
also clearly framed by her own desire 
-
Where do you feel you now stand on 
PSA: Allow me to try to explain 
what may be meant by this align-
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the grounds of gender bias from 
-
Marxists and such post-Hegelian 
Seyla Benhabib. To understand my 
readers can turn to Anderson and 
Bell, Kant and Theology -
thored book is especially useful for 
of realism and of God.
I also argue that feminist 
standpoint epistemology derives 
master/slave dialectic. But this ar-
gument is in Harding and in my 
discussion of Hegel (Anderson, A
Feminist Philosophy
essential to understand the social 
and material reality which is Hard-
-
standing, it helps to read such post-
Marxist rationalists as Hartsock, 
Habermas and Benhabib.
So, my reply to your question 
about “reality” suggests an apparent 
lack, amongst contemporary Chris-
-
in particular, philosophical knowl-
standpoint epistemologist would 
have read the Frankfurt school 
philosophers whose post-Hegelian 
-
lytic Marxism. Their view(s) of real-
ity would have to include social and 
-
sations and “evidence,” or, even, of 
more profound psychological and 
spiritual intimacy with the divine. 
Making the naïve empiricist view of 
“reality” less naïve by encompass-
theistic God is highly problematic 
for philosophers, including con-
temporary feminist philosophers. 
-
sonal God does not necessarily re-
Otherwise, there is no better 
way to understanding than for read-
ers to explore the debates about 
and so on for themselves. If they 
my position, then they should be 
aware of her distinctive theological 
-
ist feminists which inhibits careful 
understanding of post-Hegelian 
epistemology. The danger is to re-
religious experience grasped with 
-
pure experience would ignore the 
turn, this obscures the possibility 
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perspective on reality. Without the 
-
pirical and psychological relations.
of religion in the analytic tradition 
of Christian theism, but she does 
not explicitly and fairly assess ana-
lytic philosophical debates about 
reality which are more wide-rang-
ing than Christian theism or Chris-
tian mystical experience (Coakley, 
textual analysis of debates in femi-
nist epistemology, Marxist femi-
nism and Frankfurt School philoso-
phies. The highly substantial social-
ist debates in philosophy cannot be 
ignored or dismissed by feminist 
theologians without their missing 
decisive issues in feminism.
For example, I have in mind 
-
nist political philosopher and as 
militant philosopher shaped by 
-
opher shaped by both Foucault and 
Habermas. Such feminist philoso-
phers confront political culture, 
over recognition which necessar-
ily inform our conception of re-
ality. Feminist realists may claim 
different things about (the same) 
reality, but this is not necessarily 
Instead this sort of disagreement 
-
-
range of feminist challenges to what 
we know about reality forces us to 
ask whether those who believe in 
“God” are themselves in touch with 
“reality,” especially the reality of so-
-
critique, feminist claims about real-
ity and God run the danger of their 
-
derson, “Feminist Philosophy and 
-
AJ: Coakley criticized your femi-
nist challenge to analytic philoso-
phy of religion. She acknowledged 
with some approval your continu-
-
tivity and rationality, even though 
these terms. However, Coakley was 
you had been that analytic philoso-
phy was capable of cleaning up its 
own act in relation to gender con-
sciousness (Coakley, “Feminism 
PSA: Let me break in at this point 
and respond to make things more 
rest of this question about Coakley 
and analytic philosophy (below). 
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-
-
tionality. But you are not correct in 
believing Coakley is right in every-
I have never dismissed analytic 
it to my students and employ ana-
lytic tools in my conceptions of 
-
tion of “analytic philosophy” to 
“Christian philosophy of religion” 
as written by Richard Swinburne, 
William Alston, Nicholas Wolter-
storff, Alvin Plantinga and Caro-
line Franks Davis. But an analytic 
philosopher could easily think that 
“Christian philosophy of religion” 
(a) reality. The problem for Chris-
tian philosophy of religion is, then, 
how to demonstrate philosophical-
ly that their “God” is real. In other 
words, it is not clear to me either 
how Coakley can “align” herself 
“with” analytic philosophy without 
-
ic terms of her theological position 
and of philosophical realism.
AJ: It was clear too that Coakley 
wanted to defend the possibility of 
-
cal reality that could not be dis-
missed as the simple outcome of 
masculine epistemological privilege 
(Coakley, “Feminism and Analytic 
to some extent, you had conformed 
to this secularizing trope, by laying 
your emphasis on the material real-
ity implicit within power relations 
between women and men as the 
lynch pin in an argument under the 
title of the philosophy of religion. 
In any case, she was circumspect 
about your materialist account of 
standpoint epistemology, arguing 
that the account of truth and ob-
incoherent (Coakley, “Feminism 
-
ginal, privileged and everything in 
necessarily ruled out.
PSA: -
ley picks up something about meta-
physical reality and defends it as 
critique of Feuerbach and against the 
many other feminist and philosophi-
cal critiques of the concept of the 
omni-attribute God are not explicit 
enough. Coakley proposes an alter-
native to “the more anthropomor-
phic or explicitly Feuerbachian pro-
is “encountered” in an intimate or 
deeply “feminine” way (Coakley, 
“Feminism and Analytic Philoso-
of the divine as the “feminine” al-
-
rect perception of the divine of the 
dominant “masculine” conceptions 
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of the theistic God in philosophy of 
masculine binary of Christian the-
ism as hierarchal, exclusive and so, 
oppressive for those excluded and/
or subordinated.
Moreover, it is not enough to sim-
ply accuse me of picking up some-
thing “secular.” How do we know 
what aspects of reality are secular and 
that personal reality as we encounter 
be able to separate off easily what 
in reality could be secular. Is physi-
cal matter, or certain aspects of the 
philosophical reasoning does not di-
vide reality into secular and (Chris-
tian) sacred, or think that secular is 
an aspect of reality to be avoided. 
“Secular” is more likely to function 
which has been inherited from cer-
tain Christian forms of oppositional 
thinking.
Note, however, that my points 
about the term “secular” do not im-
ply that philosophical reasoning is 
neutral and non-local. But they do 
mean that philosophical arguments 
must be expressed clearly enough 
that we know what terms are being 
employed and what metaphysical 
baggage is being assumed in any dis-
cussions using such terms as God, 
reality, Christian, secular, analytic 
and so on. From my philosophical 
position and personal background, 
the danger for those seeking to put 
an end to domination and oppres-
the outside of which is secular and 
the inside is Christian. If we claim 
to live in such separate worlds, then 
we are in any case not seeing reality.
As for my account of “points of 
view” being incoherent, admittedly 
-
-
tiple” and “diverse” due to living in 
different locations. However, my 
position is not ultimately meant to 
be incoherent as long as the goal of 
feminist standpoint epistemology is 
“less partial” knowledge and not “ab-
solute” knowledge. I am not trying 
to bundle up incoherent positions 
and then claim to have coherent 
knowledge of reality. The process of 
gaining knowledge never achieves 
its ultimate goal, that is, never com-
plete or absolute knowledge of all 
impossible to achieve absolute truth 
can only seek to achieve less partial 
knowledge, doing so on democratic 
grounds (those inclusive of many 
goodness and at as much truth as we 
can fairly and honestly expect.
AJ: James Carter has recently argued 
that Coakley seems to confuse the 
aspiration towards universalism with 
an idea of uniformity that still fails 
to take into account her own epis-
temic privilege as western Christian 
theologian and senior Cambridge 
academic. In defending your per-
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spective, Carter reads your view of 
-
of knowledge that are unavoidably 
multiple, heterogeneous and com-
PSA: Thanks for the second half of 
your point (above) about Carter on 
Coakley. James Carter is very in-
-
nist standpoint,” in A Feminist 
Philosophy of Religion. I also agree 
with what Carter says about Coak-
ley, since it is based on the facts of 
the reality of our material and social 
perspectives. These are crucial.
Basically I continue to build on 
both clarifying what is there and 
developing what is now more than 
-
-
religion. This gendering gets away 
from some of the confusions of the 
label, “feminist,” in order to tease 
out what actually is assumed as the 
gendered identity in philosophi-
cal conceptions of human being or 
humanity. Thus, I would hope more 
people would read or reread A Fem-
inist Philosophy of Religion before 
merely accepting the various kinds 
of theological criticisms of my posi-
tion which we have discussed today. 
Moreover, I recommend my forth-
coming replies in Gendering Philos-
.
AJ: In relation to feminist and wom-
-
even more strongly in your recent 
have in many ways tried to promote 
would you characterize the particu-
PSA: As already suggested (above), 
reader of texts. Meticulous in her 
scholarship she has an extraordinary 
ability to uncover fascinating and sig-
in conventional readings, and so, to 
breadth and intellectual grasp of her 
scholarship is also inspiring. In her 
The Philosophi-
cal Imaginary Hipparchia’s Choice
and The Sex of Knowing
from Gabrielle Suchon, Shakespeare, 
Bacon, Locke and the early Enlight-
enment, through the nineteenth 
century with Harriet Taylor and 
and into the twentieth century with 
Beauvoir, Bergson and Deleuze to 
philosophers. In each period of phi-
losophy, Le Doeuff goes to the heart 
of cultural myths about women that 
colour the most intellectual seeming 
of scholarly texts written by men.
-
spective (as indicated above) is that 
Le Doeuff demonstrates how wom-
ability to argue and debate alongside 
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men but rather than retreat to any 
sphere for women, bracketed off 
from the world of men, she leads the 
way forward, speaking out clearly 
to be included as equal partners in 
philosophical and political debates. 
us could be as subtle, witty and con-
Doeuff is. In addition, the distinctive 
of relational charm would be crucial 
features of an engaged vision for do-
ing feminist philosophy today!
AJ: To conclude, would you like 
to say something about the work 
which you have done to carve out 
-
phy of religion for feminist philoso-
phers who are raising new and dis-
PSA: -
struggle to open new space for 
other women and men in philoso-
space for conferences and ongoing 
research since I published A Feminist 
Philosophy of Religion. This work be-
-
ics” day conference at Sunderland 
experience was formative not only 
for me but for other philosophers of 
religion who gave critical responses 
-
ing experience to have my book crit-
icized, but also an energizing time. 
critics, Beverley Clack, Feminist Phi-
losophy of Religion: Critical Readings.
Later with the help of postgraduates, 
ever Continental Philosophy of Reli-
gion conference at the University of 
of the papers delivered at that con-
ference were revised and published, 
along with other commissioned es-
says, in New Topics in Feminist Phi-
losophy of Religion: Contestations 
and Transcendence Incarnate. The 
philosophy of religion continues to 
is not my only philosophical area of 
research and publication.
Overlapping with this femi-
nist work are the research activities 
which I have developed and carried 
out in contemporary French phi-
losophy with Le Doeuff, and before 
range of international conferences. 
Last but not least, the moral and 
-
nist standpoint. In the end, the texts 
which matter most to me in philoso-
phy have come together to create the 
person I am today. It is great to have 
been able to review my personal and 
philosophical formation with you, 
Alison, in this interview. Thank you!
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